A sharp volley played itself out in the pages of the Wall Street Journal during the past two weeks on the future of anti-corruption actions at the World Bank.  The first shot was fired on October 11, with the collaboration of the Department of Institutional Integrity (INT), the Bank's internal investigative unit.  The Journal published a piece citing corruption in seven of the Bank's projects in Cambodia and complaining that Bank authorities had done nothing to address the problems.  Tellingly, the author of the article referred to documents produced by INT as " ...so sensitive that they were never shared with Cambodia's government lest they put the lives of whistleblowers at risk." Someone well connected to INT was leaking.

The Vice President for External Communications returned fire on October 18th, explaining in a letter to the editor that the Bank had taken steps to deal with Cambodian corruption.  That same day heavier guns came out at the Journal in a new article that dismissed the VP's response, characterizing it as a "runaround," and concluding: " Its smooth assurances notwithstanding, the bank's behavior in Cambodia looks like a classic example of downplaying corruption as rapidly as possible so the bank can get on with shoveling ever more money out the door, regardless of results." 

What this actually looks like is an intense internal skirmish.  What it also looks like is chaos on the anti-corruption front, as least as far as enforced procedures and policies go.  Apparently, someone at INT wants action on corruption in Cambodia.  We don't know why because no one can see the evidence (except privileged columnists at the WSJ).  We do know, however, because of our work with other whistleblowers, that INT apparently does not want action on corruption in Armenia, which it has refused to investigate thus far, nor on corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which it did investigate but then suppressed the results, nor on corruption in India, which it endlessly investigates while leaving the life-threatening fraud it has discovered unaddressed.  

At this point, it's hard to say if anyone has been badly hurt in this crossfire, but it's reasonable to guess that when someone is hurt, it's going to be a whistleblower.  It is dangerous when an institution like the Bank has no enforced policies to protect those who cooperate with investigations and audits -- or to protect whistleblowers, safeguard their disclosures and punish retaliation.  It is even more dangerous when there are no enforced procedures for handling evidence and reporting results to the Board, the government and the stakeholders.